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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of

law that no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding
summary judgment in favor of respondent Arnica?
2.

Did the trial court err in striking the affidavits

submitted by appellant in opposition to respondent's motion for
summary judgment and motion to strike appellantfs pleadings?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 24
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court determine the outcome of
this appeal.

Due to the length of these provision, the text of

each is set out in Appendix A of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July, 1981, an accident occurred involving a 1980
Dodge Mirada automobile owned by defendant Carl F. Schettler.

The

vehicle was insured under a policy issued by plaintiff Arnica
Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Arnica").

As a result of

the damages sustained in the accident, Schettler's vehicle was
taken to Pioneer Dodge in Salt Lake City for repairs.
2, 3, 10-15, 28-48A, and 51-58.)

(Record at

Arnica thereafter made payment in

full for collision repairs to Schettler and the lienholder on the
1980 Mirada, Chrysler Credit Corporation.

(Record at 3, and

715-73.)
Schettler later took the automobile from the premises of
Pioneer Dodge without Pioneer's authorization and without paying
Pioneer Dodge for the repairs to the vehicle.
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(Record at 715-7 and

1174.)

Following the unauthorized taking of the car by Schettler,

Wayne Schoenfeld, Manager of Pioneer Dodge, had the vehicle
repossessed from Schettlerfs home in Salt Lake County.

(Record at

715-7 and 1174.) Although disputed by Schettler, the Manager of
Pioneer Dodge, Wayne Schoenfeld, testified that within "one or two
days" after retaking possession of the vehicle, he received a
telephone call from Schettler wherein Schettler identified himself
as "Carl" and asked whether or not Pioneer Dodge had his
automobile.

Schoenfeld responded, "Carl, you know we have your

car," to which Schettler responded by hanging up.
1174.)

(Record at

Shortly after receiving this telephone call from

Schettler, Wayne Schoenfeld received a letter dated June 11, 1982,
from Schettlerfs then attorney, J. Harold Call, requesting to
negotiate the release of the automobile from Pioneer Dodge.
(Record at 715-74 and 1174.)
On June 9, 1982, Schettler reported his car as having
been "stolen."

On that same day, he filed a stolen vehicle report

with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department.

(Record at 715-75.)

Later, on June 22, 1982, Schettler made a written claim with Amica
for the alleged "stolen vehicle" loss.

(Record at 715-75.)

On July 8, 1982, Amica issued its Draft No. 1824946 in
the amount of $6,925.00 payable to Carl F. Schettler and Chrysler
Credit Corporation in satisfaction of the total loss claimed by
Schettler for his "stolen vehicle."

(Record at 715-77.)

Schettler

received, accepted and negotiated the draft as a complete
settlement of his claim.

In return, Schettler submitted to Amica
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the title for the 1980 Dodge Mirada.

(Record at 715-78.)

By notice

dated October 26, 1982, Schettler was advised that his insurance
with Arnica was cancelled, effective November 8, 1982.
383-412 and 715-79.)

(Record at

The contract of insurance between Arnica and

Schettler terminated no later than November 10, 1982. No
extension was requested by defendant and no reinstatement was ever
issued.

(Record at 383-412.)
Nearly two months after the termination of the contract

between Arnica and Schettler, Arnica's representatives received
notice from Detective Gary Mortensen of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff1s Department that the "stolen" vehicle had been located.
(Record at 351-357.)

At the time Arnica first learned of the

vehicle's location, it had been sold or was in the process of
being sold to a bonafide purchaser at a public auction held by
Pioneer Dodge.

(Record at 351-357, 1174.) Arnica attempted to

forestall the public sale, but was too late.

(Record at 1151.)

Thereafter, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department
investigated Schettler's conduct in relation to the submitting of
an insurance claim for the alleged "stolen" vehicle.
715-80.)

(Record at

The investigation was commenced by the Salt Lake County

Sheriff's Department upon its own initiative, rather than at the
request of Arnica or any other party to this action.

(Record at

358-359.) The investigation was protracted in part due to an
unrelated automobile accident and resulting injuries to the chief
investigating officer, Detective Gary Mortensen.

Eventually,

Detective Mortensen requested a screening with the Salt Lake
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County Attorney's Office and was seen by Deputy County Attorney
Neal Gunnerson.

(Record at 1150.)

Neal Gunnerson vaguely recalls

the screening with Detective Mortensen, and has stated that he is
certain that he did not decline to prosecute the matter, but
believes that in all probability he recommended that Mortensen
obtain additional evidence regarding the alleged insurance fraud.
(Record at 1150.)

After completing his investigation and

obtaining additional information, Detective Mortensen later
submitted the evidence at a screening with Deputy County Attorney
Ernest Jones.

(Record at 715-145 to 148, 1150 and 1159.)

Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Jones concluded from
that screening that sufficient evidence existed to warrant filing
charges for insurance fraud against Schettler.

This decision was

an independent prosecutorial decision, without any influence,
pressure or communications from Arnica or any other party to this
action.

(Record at 715 and 1159.)

Shortly thereafter, an

independent magistrate duly executed a warrant for Schettler's
arrest on the charge of insurance fraud.

(Record at 715-80.)

Following Schettler's arrest for insurance fraud, a
preliminary hearing was held at which probable cause was found for
the charge of insurance fraud and Schettler was bound over for
criminal trial.

(Record at 715-81 to 715-118.)

The criminal trial on the insurance fraud count against
Schettler resulted in a jury verdict of "not guilty."

(Record at

52. )
The instant action was commenced by Arnica on April 1,
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1985, seeking return of the $6,925.00 paid to Schettler, and
punitive damages.

(Record at 2-6, 28-35.)

Schettler first filed

a counterclaim against Amica on June 7, 1985, alleging essentially
the same theories as contained in his amended counterclaim of
December 4, 1985.

(Record at 10-15, 51-58.)

Considered in a

light most favorable to Schettler, his amended counterclaim
alleges the following theories of recovery against Amica:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Insurer bad faith;
Malicious prosecution;
Abuse of process;
Defamation (libel and slander);
Conversion;
Intentional infliction of emotional distress; and

(g)

Negligence.

(Record at 51-58. )
On or about June 4, 1986, plaintiff moved pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment
to dismiss the counterclaim of Schettler.

(Record at 338-339.)

Simultaneous with the filing of the motion for summary judgment,
Arnica also moved the court for an order striking Schettler's
pleadings, including answers, counterclaims, and third-party
compliants, and entering a default judgment in favor of Amica on
Arnica's claims.

(Record at 340-342.)

The motion to strike was

sought on the ground that the misconduct of Schettler and his
attorney during the discovery process was so egregious as to
warrant the striking of his pleadings.

(Record at 360-382.)

Defendant resisted Arnica's motions by submitting various
affidavits.

(Record at 520-547, 602-603 and 681-682.)

Amica

thereafter moved pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure to strike defendant's affidavits on the ground that the
affidavits were not made on personal knowledge.

(Record at

672-675- )
On October 31, 1986, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat
granted Arnica's motion for summary judgment, dismissing
Schettler's counterclaim, and granted Arnica's motion to strike
Schettler's affidavits, while reserving ruling on Arnica's motion
to strike Schettler's pleadings as sanctions for discovery abuses.
(Record at 722-725.)

Schettler now appeals from the final order

awarding summary judgment and dismissing his counterclaim and
third-party claims against Arnica and the other parties to this
action.

(Record at 771-773.)

The notice of appeal does not

challenge that portion of Judge Moffat's order striking Schettler's
affidavits.

(Record at 771-773.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court did not err in granting Arnica's motion
for summary judgment, dismissing Schettler's counterclaim and
third-party claims against Arnica and the other parties to this
action.

The striking of the affidavits submitted in opposition to

Arnica's motions was in accordance with Rule 56(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requiring affidavits to be made on
personal knowledge.
Defendant has failed to present any evidence in the
record from which this court can determine whether there has been
error.

Where an appellant fails to present a record from which an

appellate court can determine whether there has been error,
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failure to do so results in affirmance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT'S STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
OF THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF AMICA IS LIMITED TO THOSE ERRORS
SPECIFICALLY CITED AND SUPPORTED IN
APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
The general standard that an appellate court applies in
reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion is the
same as that employed initially by the trial court under Rule
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).

Durham v. Margetts,

See also, Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger,

27 Hawaii 113, 551 P.2d 163 (1976); Hunter v. Farmers Ins. Group,
554 P.2d 1239 (Wyo. 1976); Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo.
1976).

The standard under U.R.C.P. 56(c) is that a summary

judgment is proper when it appears "that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

See also, Thornock v. Cook, 604

P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979) .
Arnica successfully showed in the court below that
defendant's counterclaim against it was not well founded in law or
in fact. Arnica's motion for summary judgment was supported by
various affidavits based upon the personal knowledge of the
affiants.

(Record at 715-145 to 715-198.)

Based upon those

affidavits and the legal arguments respecting defendant's causes
of action against Arnica, the trial court correctly ruled that
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that Arnica
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was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on defendant's
counterclaim.
The rule governing summary judgment requires that where
affidavits are proffered in support of a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading" to create an issue of
fact.

U.R.C.P. 56(e).
Defendant attempts to obtain reversal of the trial

court's granting of summary judgment against him without reference
to any portion of the record to show there was in fact error by
the trial court. Rather, defendant relies on the mere allegations
as contained in his counterclaim.

Defendant's brief fails to cite

to any deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories,
affidavits, or other portions of the record setting forth specific
facts in support of his claim that the trial court committed error.
This court has consistently held that allegations or denials in
pleadings are not sufficient basis for opposing summary judgment
on the trial court level, or for seeking reversal of a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment on the appellate level.

See, Hall v.

Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d
at 936.
The Utah Supreme Court in Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d
251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960), was asked to review the granting of
summary judgment in an action brought by purchasers of several oil
wells to recover damages for alleged fraud, deceit, and breach of
a fiduciary relationship.

The defendant moved to dismiss and for
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summary judgment.

The motion for summary judgment was supported

by deposition testimony and sworn testimony given at the trial of
a related matter.

The plaintiffs did not explain or controvert

that evidence by counter-affidavit or otherwise.

The trial court,

accordingly, found that there was no genuine issue of material
fact, and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that the trial court
had erred in granting summary judgment against them.

The Utah

Supreme Court, upon reviewing the uncontradicted record made by
the defendant in support of his motion for summary judgment at the
trial level, stated:
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide a
substitute for the regular trial of cases in
which there are disputed issues of fact upon
which the outcome of the litigation depends.
And it should be invoked with caution to the
end that litigants may be afforded a trial
where there exists between them a bonafide
dispute of material fact. However, where the
moving partyTs evidentiary material is in
itself sufficient and the opposing party
fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when
he is presumably in a position to do so, the
court should be justified in concluding that
no genuine issue of fact is present nor would
one be present at the trial.
Dupler, 351 P.2d at 636-637 (emphasis added).
Arnica submits that defendant's failure to cite to any
specific evidence in the record should be construed as an
admission that no genuine issue of fact exists.

In addition,

Arnica maintains that it is entitled to judgment in its behalf on
defendant's counterclaim as a matter of law.
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The substantive

legal arguments supporting the trial court's granting of summary
judgment dismissing defendant's counterclaim against Arnica are
discussed at length in Arnica's Memorandum in Support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment.

See Record at 715 to 715-229-

The

arguments and analysis of that memorandum are hereby incorporated
by reference.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO SHOW ERROR IN THE
RECORD CREATES A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT AND WAIVES ANY OF THE CLAIMED
ERRORS.
As previously stated, appellant's brief fails to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact which
would constitute error by the lower court in granting summary
judgment.

Appellant leaves the task to this court of searching

the entire record to locate any such alleged error.

The Utah

Supreme Court has assumed the correctness of the judgment below
when an appellant has failed to support his argument with
citations to the record.

In State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah

1982), the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault.
The defendant appealed on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him, and that a pre-trial photograph lineup
was so unduly suggestive as to deny him due process of law. In
affirming the conviction, the court stated:
A separate and independent basis for the
affirmance of the trial court is that the
defendant failed to refer to any portion of
the record that factually supports his contentions on appeal. This court will assume
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the correctness of the judgment below if
counsel on appeal does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, as to making a
concise statement of facts and citation of
the pages in the record where they are
supported.
Id. at 756-757.
bar.

This is precisely the situation in the case at

This court should likewise affirm.
The California Court of Appeals has also recognized

that the failure of an appellant to support his claims of error
with appropriate citations to the record creates a presumption of
correctness of the judgment below.

In City of Lomita v. City of

Torrance, 148 Cal. 3d 1062, 196 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1983), the court
affirmed a ruling in part on the ground that adequate reference to
the record was not made on appeal to permit appellate review of
the lower court's decision.

The court stated:

"The rule is well established that a reviewing
court must presume that the record contains
evidence to support every finding of fact,
and an appellant who contends that some
particular finding is not supported is required
to set forth in his brief a summary of the
material evidence upon that issue. Unless this
is done, the error assigned is deemed to be
waived. [Citation] It is incumbent upon
appellants to state fully, with transcript
references, the evidence which is claimed to
be insufficient to support the findings.
(McCosker v. McCosker (1954) 122 Cal. App. 2d
498, 500 [265 P.2d 21].) It is neither
practical nor appropriate for [a reviewing
court] to comb the record on [an appellant's]
behalf." (In Re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25
Cal. 3d 877, 887-88, 160 Cal. Rptr. 516, 603
P.2d 881. )
City of Lomita, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 542-543 (emphasis added).
Rule 24(a)(7) and (e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
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Court requires appellants and respondents to make appropriate
references in their briefs to the record below:
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the
appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order here indicated:
* * *

(7) A statement of the case* The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in
the court below. There shall follow
a statement of facts relevant to the
issues presented for review. All
statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record.
(See Paragraph (e)).
* * *

(e) References in brief to the record.
References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 11(b) . . . .
(emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court in Uckerman v. Lincoln National
Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978), in interpreting the
predecessor rule to Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,
recognized that the court need not, and should not, consider any
facts not properly cited to the record.

The plaintiff in Uckerman

brought an action against the defendant insurer over the payment
of certain life insurance proceeds.

The insurer's motion for

summary judgment was granted by the trial court.

On appeal, the

Utah Supreme Court, in affirming the entry of summary judgment,
noted:
Appellant makes many immaterial factual allegations that are not supported by the record
-12-

and has failed to cite those portions of the
record that do support the material facts as
is required by Rule 75(p)(2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. This court need not, and will
not, consider any facts not properly cited to,
or supported by, the record.
Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
This court likewise in Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas,
699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985), and Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah
359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952), refused to address claims of error where
appellants failed to cite from the record to support their
assertions.

See also, State v. Cash, 727 P.2d 218 (Utah 1986);

First National Bank v. Smoot, 72 Utah 215, 269 P. 518 (1928).
Other jurisdictions have similarly refused to review
assignments of error where an appellant fails to cite the court to
any evidence in the record to support of the claimed error. The
Arizona Court of Appeals in Adams v. Valley National Bank, 139
Ariz. 340, 678 P.2d 525 (1984), found that an appellant's failure
to cite to evidence in the record to substantiate his claims would
result in dismissal of the appeal. The court noted:
In a typical case when the court is confronted
with a brief of this quality, we simply bite
our tongues and endeavor to determine what
argument has been raised on appeal and proceed
to dispose of it. In most of these cases, the
appellant's position is unfounded and the ruling
below is affirmed in a memorandum decision. In
truth, we do a disservice to everyone in such
situations. A muddled brief generally reflects
the fact that there is little basis for an appeal
in the first place. The client in a civil case
ought to be advised of this unhappy truth and
discouraged from proceeding. The bar is hindered
in pressing forward cases with merit when the
courts are forced to expend time on cases without
merit.
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* * *

We are not required to assume the duties of an
advocate and search voluminous records and
exhibits to substantiate an appellant's claims,
Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz- at 414, 420 P.2d
at 285. Sound judicial practice in our everburgeoning docket prohibit us from carrying the
banner on behalf of the ill-advised appellant.
We should not be constrained to neglect the many
meritorious appeals that are awaiting our
decision by spending our time needlessly in
an attempt to do the job of the lawyer.
Adams, 678 P.2d at 527-528 (emphasis added).
The California Court of Appeals in Niederer v. Ferreiara,
189 Cal. 3d 1485, 234 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1987), affirmed a lower
court's decision in part due to the appellant's failure to support
his alleged claims of error with appropriate citations to the
record.

The court stated:
Hampering our further review of [appellant's]
contention is his failure to include the crosscomplaint and answer thereto in the record on
appeal. We do not know the basis of his claim
against the [respondents], so it cannot be
determined whether the trial court ruled
properly on the claim. It is an appellant's
duty to present a record from which the
appellate court can determine whether there
has been error; failure to do so results in
affirmance.
Additionally, a reviewing court begins with the
presumption that the record contains evidence
sufficient to support the judgment, and it is
an appellant's burden to demonstrate there is
no substantial evidence to support the judgment.
As stated in Grand v. Griesinger (1958) 160
Cal. App. 2d 397, 403, 325 P.2d 475: "'It is
encumbent upon appellants to state fully, with
transcript references, the evidence which is
claimed to be insufficient to support the
findings. The reviewing court is not called
upon to make an independent search of the
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record where this rule is ignored, [Citation.]1
A claim against sufficiency of the evidence to
justify the findings, consisting of mere
assertion without a fair statement of the
evidence, is entitled to no consideration,
when it is apparent, as it is here, that a
substantial amount of evidence was received
on behalf of the [cross-defendants].'"
[Appellant] here does not refer in his brief
to any of the evidence presented by the
[respondents]; he does not demonstrate why it
is legally or factually insufficient to support
the judgment in their favor. This failure,
along with the inadequate record, must be
deemed to waive [appellant's] final contention
on appeal.
Niederer, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 794-795 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).

See also, Adrian v. Lockridge, 285 Ala. 222, 231 So.2d

95 (1970) (failure to support assignments of error with
appropriate citations to the record constitutes a waiver and
abandonment of the claimed errors); Mast v. Standard Oil Co., 140
Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137 (1984) (appellate courts should not have to
search the record to find facts to defeat a summary judgment
motion on appeal); Lashinshy v. Hoffmann, 3 Ariz. App., 411 P.2d
467 (1966) (an appellate court may reject assignment of error
absent specific references to the record supporting those
assignments); Cecil v. Gila County, 70 Ariz. 320, 227 P.2d 217
(1951) (appellate courts need not consider assignments of error
without indications as to where in the record the errors may be
found); Crider v. State, 115 Ga. App. 347, 154 S.E.2d 743 (1967)
(appellate courts may refuse to consider issues on appeal not
supported by references to the record); Leite v. Sambo's
Restaurants, Inc., 264 Or. 498, 506 P.2d 176 (1973) (appellate
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courts may refuse to address issues not supported by citations to
the record); Robert v. Tennessee Wesleyan College, 60 Tenn. Ct.
App. 624, 450 S.W.2d 21 (1969), (where an appellant fails to cite
to the record where alleged assignments of error occurred, the
error will not be considered on appeal).
The failure of an appellant to reference claims of error
to specific portions of the record substantiating those claims
also imposes an unfair duty on the respondent.

Arnica has received

no guidance from appellant's brief as to what facts he relies on
in asserting the lower court committed error.

Without such

guidance, Arnica has been disadvantaged in the preparation of its
brief.

Under such circumstances, this court should find defendant

to have waived or abandoned the claimed errors, and affirm the
lower court's ruling.
POINT III.
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS WERE PROPERLY STRICKEN
IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Appellant's brief also asserts that the trial court erred
in striking the affidavits submitted by him in opposition to
Arnica's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike
appellant's pleadings.

It should be noted that defendant's notice

of appeal fails to complain of that portion of Judge Moffat's
order dated October 31, 1986.

(Record at 771-773.) Furthermore,

it should be noted that defendant has failed to point to any
evidence in the record that those affidavits were based upon the
personal knowledge of the affiants.
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Indeed, defendant neglects to

even give the court any indication as to where the striken
affidavits may be found in the record-

Therefore, Arnica

respectfully contends that any claim of error in the striking of
those affidavits has been waived by defendant.
In the event that defendant is not found to have waived
or abandoned his right to claim error in regard to the striking of
the subject affidavits, even a cursory review of those affidavits
reveals that the affidavits contain heresay and opinion testimony
clearly not within the personal knowledge of the affiants. See
Record at at 672-675. As such, the affidavits submitted by
defendant were insufficient to create an issue of fact. Treloggan
v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Melby, 699
P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); Western States Thrift and Loan Co. v.
Blomguist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972).

Furthermore, even

if the stricken affidavits complied with the Rule 56(e) standard
requiring statements based on personal knowledge, the affidavits
are insufficient to defeat Amica's motion for summary judgment
since they were directed primarily at defeating Amica's motion for
sanctions, rather than at the summary judgment motion.
CONCLUSION
The arguments raised by appellant's brief are nothing
more than in invitation for this court to hunt out something in
the record to support his claims of error.

Rule 24 of the Rules

of the Utah Supreme Court requires that appellant make specific
citation to the record for all statements of fact. Appellant's
brief does not given this court nor respondent any indication of
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what evidence appellant relies on in claiming that issues of
material fact remain which would have thereby precluded the
awarding of summary judgment in favor of Arnica.
This court in reviewing the judgment by the lower court
is necessarily limited in its scope of review to those errors
which are identified by defendant and supported by citations to
the record.

Because defendant has failed to so direct this

court's review, the presumption applies that no error can be
demonstrated by the record.
Additionally, defendant's failure to demonstrate facts
within the record in support of claimed error creates a
presumption in favor of affirmance and waives any claim of error.
The judgment of the trial court granting Arnica's motion for
summary judgment, dismissing defendant's counterclaim, and
granting Arnica's motion to strike defendant's affidavits should,
therefore, be affirmed.
DATED this

day of

, 1987.

STRONG & HANNI

By
S. Baird Morgan
Mark J. Taylor
Stephen J. Trayner
Attorneys for Respondent
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APPENDIX A
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
* * *

(b)

For defending party. A party against whom
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.

(c)

Motions and proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damage.
* * *

(e)

Form of affidavit; further testimony;
defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or
served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed
by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as
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provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavit or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, If appropriate, shall be entered
against him.

RULE 24, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the
appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order here indicated:
* * *

(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in
the court below. There shall follow
a statement of facts relevant to the
issues presented for review. All
statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record.
(See Paragraph (e)).
* * *

(e) References in brief to the record.
References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 11(b) . . . .
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